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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Steven Bowman appeals, contending that the district court erred when it denied 
his motion to suppress the evidence found in his case. To that point, he makes several 
specific assignments of error. 
First, he contends that the officers performed an unlawful pat down search of his 
person, since they did not have reasonable suspicion that he was armed and presently 
dangerous when they conducted that search. As such, he contends that a scale found 
during that search, as well as the evidence ultimately found as a result of a search of 
that (i.e., the methamphetamine giving rise to the charge to which Mr. Bowman 
pied guilty in this case) should be suppressed. 
Second, he contends that whatever, if any, reasonable suspicion arose from that 
initial pat down search evaporated when that pat down did not reveal any contraband 
(the scale was not immediately evident as contraband, since officers returned it to 
Mr. Bowman's possession after seeing what it was) and when a drug dog sniffing his 
vehicle did not alert on the vehicle. As a result, he contends that when the officers 
subsequently seized his scale to examine it, that seizure occurred without any 
reasonable suspicion. Therefore, he asserts that the seizure of his scale was unlawful. 
Third, Mr. Bowman contends that, because the officers had completed the 
purpose of the stop when they gave him the citation for the underlying traffic stop during 
the dog sniff, the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop by continuing the dog sniff and 
by continuing to question him and to seize his property (specifically, the scale) after the 
dog sniff of his car ended without an alert. Therefore, he asserts that the seizure of the 
scale was unlawful. 
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Finally, he contends that any consent he might have given in regard to the 
searches following the dog sniff of his car was not voluntary, but rather, acquiescence to 
the officers overbearing his will. Therefore, he asserts that acquiescence does not 
justify those warrantless searches of his person and property. 
For any and all of those reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's 
order denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Around midnight on February 1, 2013, Officers David Jones and Tad Miller were 
working a routine patrol when they ran the registration on a vehicle driving past, found it 
to be cancelled, and initiated a traffic stop. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.1 - p.9, L.11.)1 The vehicle 
in question, which had been registered to Mr. Bowman, pulled into a nearby hotel 
parking lot. (Tr., Vol.1, p.9, Ls.8-22.) The vehicle had two occupants, and the officers 
each approached one side of the car.2 Officer Jones approached the passenger, who 
turned out to be Mr. Bowman, and noticed that Mr. Bowman as not wearing a seat belt. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.7-11.) Officer Jones and Officer Miller both noticed that 
Mr. Bowman appeared exceedingly nervous. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.15, Ls.17-21.) For 
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in three separately bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts 
from the hearings on Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress held on September 20, 2013, 
and October 4, 2013. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the 
pretrial conference hearing held on October 17, 2013. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume 
containing the transcripts of the October 29, 2013, change of plea hearing and the 
December 12, 2013, sentencing hearing. 
2 The officers were each wearing audio devices. Recordings from those devices were 
admitted as exhibits during the hearings on the motion to suppress. If possible, 
references to those recordings will identify the relevant period of the recording. 
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Mr. Bowman kept picking up and documents in a manner that 
Officer Jones thought was not normal.3 (Tr., Vol.1, 1 Ls.8-1 ) 
However, despite Officer Jones having to Mr. Bowman on several occasions 
to quit reaching around in the car, Mr. Bowman was cooperative in answering Officer 
Jones' questions. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.18-25.) For example, Mr. Bowman truthfully told 
Officer Jones that he had a prior record consisting of drug charges and illegal 
possession of a weapon. (Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.2-13.) Nevertheless, Officer Miller 
decided, based only on the fact that Mr. Bowman was showing signs of nervousness, to 
call for a canine unit to come to the scene. (Tr., Vol.1, p.88, Ls.15-23.) 
Meanwhile, Officer Jones checked the identifications of both Mr. Bowman and 
the driver (Mr. Bowman's girlfriend, Kayla Martinez). (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.20-25.) 
Mr. Bowman's license was valid and there were not any warrants for his arrest. (See 
Tr., Vol.1, p.19, Ls.7-12.) On the other hand, Ms. Martinez not only had a suspended 
license, but a warrant for her arrest as well. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.16-19; Tr., Vol.1, p.19, 
Ls.7-12.) As a result, the officers placed Ms. Martinez under arrest and put her in their 
police vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.19, Ls.17-22.) Officer Jones intended to write Mr. Bowman 
a ticket for failure to wear a safety belt.4 (Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.1-10.) However, as a 
3 When Officer Jones had informed Mr. Bowman that the registration on the car had 
been cancelled, Mr. Bowman replied that he knew his insurance was bad, but that he 
did not realize his registration was bad as well. (Exhibit 1, approximately 1 :20.) As 
such, it appears the documents Mr. Bowman was looking at were his registration 
papers. 
4 There was some discussion about whether the officers would also give Mr. Bowman a 
citation for no registration and no insurance. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.7-10.) The 
audio recordings indicate that the officers decided to be lenient with Mr. Bowman. (See 
Exhibit 1, approximately 7:10 (Officer Jones telling Mr. Bowman, 'We want to try not to 
write you guys every ticket in the book"); Exhibit 2, approximately 13:00 (Officer Jones 
telling Mr. Bowman, "I'm going to give you some breaks. I'm going to write you a seat 
belt ticket though, okay?").) The only ticket that was ultimately written for Mr. Bowman 
wasforfailuretoweara safety belt. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.97, Ls.18-21.) 
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result of the lack of registration, Officer Jones was not going to let Mr. Bowman drive the 
car from the scene. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.20, Ls.20-22.) In fact, all Officer Jones told 
Mr. Bowman, when Mr. Bowman asked if he was free to leave, was "we will have to 
work through that." (Tr., Vol.1, p.39, L.19 - p.40, L.4.) 
During this time, two other officers arrived in the parking lot to deal with an 
unrelated issue. (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, L.21 - p.90, L.8.) However, Officer Miller was 
planning to enlist their aid in dealing with Mr. Bowman and Ms. Martinez; specifically, 
the "plan was to have [Mr. Bowman and Ms. Martinez] transported separately to the jail. 
Have the girlfriend in one car and then Mr. Bowman in another vehicle."5 (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.90, Ls.11-17.) Officer Steve Bonas also arrived with his drug dog Ruwa during this 
time. 6 According to Officer Bonas, Ruwa is trained to detect narcotics and apprehend 
fleeing persons. (Tr., Vol.1, p.108, Ls.20-23.) To avoid a potential confrontation 
between Mr. Bowman and Ruwa, Officer Jones asked Mr. Bowman to get out of the car 
before Officer Bonas had Ruwa sniff the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.16-23; Tr., Vol.1, p.22, 
L.23 - p.23, 2.) When Mr. Bowman got out of the car, Officer Jones asked Mr. Bowman 
if he had any weapons on him, and Mr. Bowman stated that he had a pocket knife in his 
coat pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.2-6.) Officer Jones located the knife and secured it in 
his own pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.9.) He then continued to pat down Mr. Bowman. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.19-23.) 
While Officer Jones was conducting this search, Officer Miller asked Mr. Bowman 
if he could search the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.74, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Bowman refused to give that 
5 Thus, Officers Jones and Miller would transport either Mr. Bowman or Ms. Martinez in 
their car, and the other person would ride with the two other officers. The third car that 
ultimately arrived on the scene had the drug dog. 
6 In some portions of the record, the dog's name is misspelled as "Ruha." 
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(Tr., Vol.1, p.74, 
felt an object in 
12-13.) As Officer 
Bowman's right 
continued down 
pocket, 
as "a hard object, a large hard object." (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, Ls.4-6.) When he asked 
Mr. Bowman what it was, Mr. Bowman said he was not sure. (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, 
Ls.10-13.) Officer Jones asked if he could see the object to make sure it was not a 
weapon or a bomb.7 (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Bowman told Officer Jones he 
could look at the item. (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, Ls.22-25.) The item turned out to be a scale, 
which Officer Jones placed back in Mr. Bowman's pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.30, L.17 - p.31, 
L.2.) Officer Jones found nothing else of interest during the pat down search. (See 
Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.7-10.) At that point, Officer Jones went to write the citation for 
Mr. Bowman. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.16-21.) 
Officer Bonas watched the pat down search, and, after it was completed, he 
deployed Ruwa on Mr. Bowman's car to sniff for the odor of drugs. (Tr., Vol.1, p.123 
L.2 - p.124, L.8.) Ruwa did not alert on Mr. Bowman's car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.124, Ls.16-17.) 
As a result, Officer Bonas placed Ruwa back in his patrol vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.124, 
Ls.18-21.) In the meantime, Officer Miller continued to question Mr. Bowman. 
(See generally Exhibit 2 (audio recording from Officer Miller's equipment).) He asked 
Mr. Bowman what he did with the scale, and Mr. Bowman explained that he used it to 
weigh letters so he could attach the appropriate postage. (Tr., Vol.1, p. 76, Ls.13-18.) 
Officer Miller then asked if he could see the scale, and Mr. Bowman shook his head, 
indicating that he would not consent to Officer Miller taking the scale. (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, 
L.22 - p.78, L.3.) According to Officer Miller, Mr. Bowman was not displaying any signs 
7 Officer Jones admitted during the hearing on Mr. Bowman's subsequent motion to 
suppress that he did not really believe that the object he felt in Mr. Bowman's pocket 
might have been a bomb. (Tr., Vol.1, p.46, Ls.20-22.) 
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being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Tr., Vol. 1, L.16 100, 
Officer Miller was questioning Bowman was 
sniff of the car, Officer Jones returned and gave Mr. Bowman a ticket for not wearing his 
safety belt. (Tr., Vol.1, p.97, Ls.18-21.) Officer Miller admitted that, at that point, they 
were only keeping Mr. Bowman there until Ruwa finished sniffing the car because they 
did not have any reason to arrest Mr. Bowman. (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.5-14; Tr., Vol.1, 
p.100, Ls.14-17.) 
After completing the sniff of Mr. Bowman's car and putting Ruwa back in his 
vehicle, Officer Bonas returned to where Officer Miller and Mr. Bowman were standing 
and informed Officer Miller that Ruwa had not alerted on the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.85, 
19-21.) Officer Bonas then asked to see the scale. (Tr., Vol.1, p.127, Ls.22-24.) 
Mr. Bowman acquiesced and let Officer Bonas take the scale. (Tr., Vol.1, p.128, 
Ls.1-3.) Officer Bonas walked away from everyone else and looked at the scale with a 
flashlight. (Tr., Vol.1, p.128, Ls.6-9.) He claimed that he saw several "very small 
particles," not even the size of "flakes," on the scale.8 (Tr., Vol.1, p.129, Ls.14-15.) 
Officer Bonas went back to his vehicle, got Ruwa out again, and had Ruwa sniff the 
scale. (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.13-22.) This time, Officer Bonas reported that Ruwa 
alerted on the scale. (Tr., Vol.1, p.131, Ls.4-8.) 
In the meantime, Officer Miller continued to talk with Mr. Bowman. That 
conversation became more confrontational than it had originally been. ( See Exhibit 2, 
approximately 13:40-16: 10.) Officer Miller said that Mr. Bowman was still acting 
nervous, continuing to move his hands toward his pockets. (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.24-25.) 
8 Defense counsel represented that the scale was subsequently tested at the state 
crime laboratory, and the results were negative for controlled substances. (R., p.127.) 
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As a result, Officer Miller decided to perform another pat down search of Mr. Bowman. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.98, L.18 - p.99, L.5.) All Officer Miller found was some chap stick and 
some cigarettes. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.99, Ls.6-10.) However, when Officer Bonas told the 
other officers that Ruwa had alerted on the scale, they placed Mr. Bowman under arrest 
for possession of drug paraphernalia. (Tr., Vol.1, p.79, Ls.16-24.) They proceeded to 
search the car and found additional evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia under the 
passenger seat. (Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.15-21.) 
Mr. Bowman was ultimately charged with possession of methamphetamine and 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.34-35.) The State also filed a 
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.43-44.) Mr. Bowman filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence found. (R., p.73.) The district court denied that motion, 
considering the various challenges Mr. Bowman had made. First, the district court 
found that Officer Jones had reasonable suspicion to pat down Mr. Bowman based on 
his excessively nervous behavior, his disclosed criminal history, and his admitted 
possession of a knife. (R., pp.141-42.) 
Second, the district court determined that Mr. Bowman's consent to allow Officer 
Jones to look at the unknown object in his pocket (the scale) was voluntary. 
(R., pp.142-44.) In that regard, it noted that the ratio of officers (three plus the dog) to 
suspects (two) was not unusual given the time and location of the stop, the tone of the 
conversation was mostly conversational and polite but had authoritative overtones, 
Mr. Bowman was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and Mr. Bowman knew of 
his right to refuse consent. 9 (R., pp.142-43.) Third, the district court also decided that, 
9 The district court noted that Mr. Bowman evidenced his knowledge of the right to 
refuse consent by refusing to allow Officer Miller to search the car right before Officer 
Jones asked to look at the item in his pocket. (R., p.143.) 
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although was not raised, the same finding of voluntariness applied 
r. to Officer Bonas the scale. 10 , p.144.) 
Fourth, the district court found that Ruwa's alert on the scale gave officers 
probable cause to search the car, and that they could also search it incident to 
Mr. Bowman's arrest. (R., p.144.) The district court also stated that it was considering 
Mr. Bowman's refusal to consent in its determination that there was probable cause to 
search the car. (R., p.144.) Finally, it concluded that the officers had not unreasonably 
prolonged the stop because, once the officers found the scale, the nature of the stop 
changed and they could investigate for potential drug-related crimes. (R., p.146.) 
Therefore, the district court concluded that the order of Officer Bonas' actions 
(deploying Ruwa on Mr. Bowman's car and his seizure and subsequent examination of 
the scale) was irrelevant because they were part of the same justified investigation. 
(R., p.147.) The district court made no findings on whether the reasonable suspicion 
evaporated when Ruwa did not alert on the car. (See generally R.; see R., p.130 
(Mr. Bowman raising the issue of dispelled reasonable suspicion in regard to his 
challenge that the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop).) 
Mr. Bowman ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea 
agreement. He reserved his right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.5, Ls.17-19.) He also agreed to enter an Alford plea to possession of 
methamphetamine. 11 (Tr., Vol.3, L.13.) The State agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia 
charge and the persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., Vol.3, p.5, Ls.14-15.) The district 
10 Since the district court ruled on this issue, it may be raised on appeal. State v. 
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998). 
11 Pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a defendant may enter a 
guilty plea while maintaining his factual innocence. 
8 
court imposed and executed a unified sentence of seven years, with two and one-half 
years fixed. (R., pp.157-59.) Mr. Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.164-66.) 
9 
Whether district court 
ISSUE 
by denying Mr. 
10 
motion 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 'The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend 
IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v . .Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
unreasonable and seizures. IDAH0 CONST. Art. I,§ ·1?; State v. Donato, 1 
Idaho 469,471 (2001 ). 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State 
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated 
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also State v. 
Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I,§ 17 
of the Idaho Constitution). 
There are several reasons why the searches of Mr. Bowman in this case were 
unlawful. Officer Jones' initial pat down of Mr. Bowman, which led to the discovery of 
the scale in the first place, was unlawful because there was no evidence that 
Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous. Additionally, since Officer Jones 
returned the scale to Mr. Bowman (evidencing that it did not appear to be contraband) 
and because Ruwa did not alert on the car, whatever reasonable suspicion the officers 
11 
may have had from Officer Jones' search dissipated. Furthermore, because Officer 
Jones had completed the purpose of the stop during Ruwa's sniff of the car, the officers 
unlawfully prolonged the stop by having Ruwa continue to sniff the car. They also 
unlawfully prolonged the stop by continuing to detain Mr. Bowman after Ruwa finished 
sniffing tt1e car because any reasonable suspicion that the officers may have had 
dissipated when Ruwa did not alert on the car. 
Also, when Officer Bonas asked Mr. Bowman to let him see the scale during the 
portion of the detention that was unlawfully prolonged, the totality of the circumstances 
demonstrate that Mr. Bowman's purported consent was not voluntary. Rather, he 
acquiesced to the continuing pressure of the officers during the unlawfully-prolonged 
detention. In the absence of voluntary consent, Officer Bonas did not have an 
independent justification to search Mr. Bowman, particularly since Officer Jones had 
already performed a pat down search on Mr. Bowman and Ruwa did not alert on 
Mr. Bowman's car. For any and all of these reasons, the scale should be suppressed, 
as well as all the evidence found as a result of seizing that scale, as that evidence was 
fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 
(1963) (explaining that evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree if the officers found that 
evidence by exploiting information or evidence found illegally); State v. Bainbridge, 117 
Idaho 245, 249 (1990) (same). Officer Bonas' search of the scale gave the officers the 
justification to search Mr. Bowman's car, and since the search of the scale was 
unlawful, the evidence found in the car was fruit of the poisonous tree. 
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B. Neither Officer Jones Nor Officer Bonas Had A Reasonable Suspicion That 
Mr. Bowman Was Armed And Presently Dangerous, And So, Their Searches Of 
Him Were Unlawful 
Officer Jones' initial pat down of Mr. Bowman and Officer Bonas' of 
Mr. Bowman's pocket to seize the could only be justified under the exception to 
the warrant requirement identified in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 12 In Terry, the 
United States Supreme Court held that officers may conduct pat down searches of the 
outer layer of a person's clothing for weapons, provided they have a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, because those searches serve to protect the safety of the 
officer and others in the area. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). However, when there 
is not a reasonable suspicion that the person poses a present threat to the safety of the 
officers or others nearby, this exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable: 
The primary concern of the Supreme Court in Terry and its 
progeny . . . was to protect the safety of officers and others from harm 
when dealing with a person who may pose a risk. As the Terry court put 
it, "where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel [the 
officer's] reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the 
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
weapons that might be used to assault him." 
Our inquiry then is to determine whether it was objectively 
reasonable for [the officer] to conclude a pat down search was necessary 
for the protection of himself or others. 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 661 (2007) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30) (emphasis 
added). The officers did not have had the requisite reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous when they conducted their respective 
searches. Therefore, because either or both of those searches were unlawful, the scale 
12 Absent valid consent, the only way for Officer Bonas to have got hold of the scale was 
to search Mr. Bowman's pocket. As will be discussed in depth in Section D, infra, 
Mr. Bowman did not give valid consent to Officer Bonas. 
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discovered and subsequently seized as a result of those searches should have been 
suppressed. 
1. Officer Jones' Pat Down Of Mr. Bowman Was Unlawful 
Officer Jones' initial pat down of Mr. Bowman was not justified because he did 
not have a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous. 
The fact that a person has told an officer that he is in possession of a knife does not 
necessarily give the officer justification to conduct a pat down search, since such a 
statement does not, by itself demonstrate that the person poses a present risk to officer 
safety. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,819 (2009). 13 . 
In fact, this case is very similar to the situation addressed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Henage. In that case, officers initiated a traffic stop of the car being driven by 
Mr. Henage and his brother. Henage, 143 Idaho at 657. Officers told Mr. Henage that 
he was not under arrest, but they wanted to still ask him some questions. Id. at 657-58. 
Mr. Henage was "nervous, but he was real cooperative and he was polite," as he 
answered the officers' questions. Id. at 658. When officers asked for his permission to 
search the car, he refused to give his consent. Id. Officers then asked if he had any 
contraband on him, and Mr. Henage replied that he had a knife. Id. One of the officers 
performed a pat down search to locate the knife. Id. The officer located the knife, put it 
back in Mr. Henage's pocket, and continued the search. Id. 
During that continuation of the search, the officer "felt a large hard object in one 
of [Mr. Henage's] cargo pockets." Id. When asked, Mr. Henage said he did not know 
13 This holding from Bishop was also previously articulated in two separate concurring 
opinions in Henange authored by Chief Justice Schroeder and Justice Eismann. 
Henage, 143 Idaho at 663. 
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what it was. Id. The officer reached into the pocket and removed a glass pipe and a 
cigar tube, which was determined to contain methamphetamine. Id. The Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence that Mr. Henage was armed and 
presently dangerous after the officer located the knife and returned it to Mr. Henage's 
pocket. Id. at 661-62. Therefore, the evidence found in Mr. Henage's pocket during 
that unlawful pat down had to be suppressed. Id. at 663. The Court of Appeals has 
since held that, once officers assure themselves that an item found during a Terry 
search does not pose a threat to their safety, they are not justified in further searching 
those items. State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730-31 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the 
officers had no justification to warrantlessly search a mint tin seized during a Terry 
search). 
Much like in Henage, officers initiated a traffic stop on Mr. Bowman's vehicle. 
Although he appeared nervous, he was cooperative and polite as he answered the 
officers' questions. 14 (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.18-19.) Mr. Bowman, like Mr. Henage, 
14 This is true even though Mr. Bowman did move his hands around (for example, 
toward his pockets) during the encounter. (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.24-25; Tr., Vol.1, p.12, 
L.18 - p.13, L.15.) It was, after all, midnight in midwinter. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.1-2.) 
The Court of Appeals has considered a similar situation and concluded: 
Although Davenport was not completely cooperative, for he kept returning 
his hands to his pockets, the tenor of the conversation between Davenport 
and the officer was casual and calm. Davenport exhibited no aggression 
nor antagonism toward the officer, and placing hands in pockets is not 
unusual .... We conclude that on the facts presented here, where there 
was no furtive or aggressive behavior or suspicious circumstances, 
Davenport's act of returning his hands to his pockets on a cold night 
despite the officer's contrary instruction did not create reasonable 
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. 
Davenport, 144 Idaho at 103. Here, as in Davenport, the tenor of the conversation was 
mostly casual and calm, and Mr. Bowman displayed no antagonism toward the officers. 
(R., p.143) He simply kept moving his hands toward his pockets, which was not 
unreasonable, as it was midnight in midwinter. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.1-2.) His other 
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refused to give consent to search his car. (Tr., VoL1, p.74, Ls.9-·13.) He also, like 
Mr. Henage, told officers that he was carrying a knife. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.2-6.) Officer 
Jones performed a search of Mr. Bowman to locate the knife and removed it from his 
control. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.9.) As such, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate 
that Mr. Bowman did not preset a threat to the officers' safety, even though he had a 
knife in his pocket. 
The only other factors which the district court relied on in its determination that 
Officer Jones' search was justified were Mr. Bowman's past record and nervous 
behavior. However, neither of those facts actually created a reasonable suspicion 
that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous. For example, the fact that 
Mr. Bowman had, at one point in the past, possessed a weapon illegally, does not 
indicate that he was armed and presently dangerous. This is particularly true here, 
since the facts show that the conversation between Mr. Bowman and Officer Jones was 
calm and cooperative. In that same regard, the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out 
that the fact that a person appears nervous does not, by itself, justify the conclusion that 
he is armed and presently dangerous, particularly when the officer does not connect 
that "'nervousness with anything tending to demonstrate a risk to [the officer's] safety."' 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819 (quoting Henage, 143 Idaho at 662-63); State v. Davenport, 
144 Idaho 99, 103 (Ct. App. 2007). Here, as in Bishop, the officers simply testified that 
Mr. Bowman was nervous, perhaps excessively so, but they did not connect that 
nervousness to any specific facts suggesting that there was a risk that their safety was 
movements while he was inside the car also did not indicate furtive or aggressive 
behavior, as Mr. Bowman simply kept looking at documents (likely, his registration 
papers). (See Tr., Vol.1, pp13, Ls.8-15.) Therefore, that behavior did not give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous. 
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compromised. (See generally R.) Therefore, the evidence did not demonstrate that 
Officer Jones had a reasonable suspicion that would justify his warrantless search of 
Mr. Bowman. 
Therefore, as in Henage, there was no reasonable suspicion for Officer Jones to 
continue searching Mr. Bowman, and so, the scale found in his pocket during that 
unlawful search should have been suppressed. 
2. Officer Bonas' Search Of Mr. Bowman And Seizure Of The Scale Was 
Unlawful Absent Valid Consent 
In regard to Officer Bonas' further search and seizure of the scale, he had even 
less reasonable suspicion to search Mr. Bowman under Terry that Officer Jones did. 
Officer Bonas watched Officer Jones' search of Mr. Bowman before deploying Ruwa. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.2-12.) As such, he saw that Officer Jones had taken 
Mr. Bowman's knife and had found no other weapons or obvious contraband. 15 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.7-10.) Therefore, Officer Bonas had no reasonable belief that 
Mr. Bowman was either armed or presently dangerous. As such, Officer Bonas had no 
independent justification to search Mr. Bowman or seize the scale in his pocket. 
Therefore, the evidence flowing from that unlawful conduct should be suppressed. 
Compare Henage, 143 Idaho at 662-63. 
15 As Officer Jones admitted, even though he had told Mr. Bowman that the item in 
Mr. Bowman's pocket could be a bomb, he never really suspected that it was a bomb. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.46, Ls.20-22.) That admission suggests that a reasonable person feeling 
the object in Mr. Bowman's pocket would not have reasonably suspected it to be a 
weapon, and thus, would not have reasonably believed the officers' safety was 
compromised by that object. Additionally, the fact that he returned it to Mr. Bowman's 
possession when Mr. Bowman was not otherwise restrained evidenced that there was 
nothing inherently suspicious about the scale. 
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Additionally, even if Officer justified in ing Mr. 
he had no justification to since it was evident without that 
seizure that the scale did not present a threat to his safety. Compare Faith, 141 Idaho 
at 730-31. In Faith, the officers conducted a Terry search on Mr. Faith and felt an object 
in his pocket which was not immediately identifiable, but did not feel like a weapon. Id. 
at 729. An officer removed the object from Mr. Faith's pocket; it was an Altoids-brand 
mint tin. Id. The officer testified that, in his experience, such containers can be used to 
transport drugs. Id. Therefore, one of the officers opened the tin and found 
methamphetamine. Id. The Court of Appeals held that, once the officers had confirmed 
that the item was not a weapon, and therefore, not a threat to their they had no 
justification to continue to search the item. Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31. 
Applying that rule in this case, the fact that the officers had seen the scale did not 
justify Officer Bonas' warrantless search of Mr. Bowman to seize the scale. This is true 
even though Officer Jones testified that a scale can be used in relation to illicit activities. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.17-24.) Officer Jones had obviously already concluded that the 
scale did not pose a threat to the officers' safety, since he gave it back to Mr. Bowman. 
Compare Henage, 143 Idaho at 662 ("Add this to the fact that [the officer] actually 
returned the Leatherman to [Mr. Henage], and we simply cannot say that the totality of 
the circumstances creates a reasonable inference that [Mr. Henage] posed a risk to the 
safety of [the officer] or others.") (emphasis in original). Therefore, Officer Bonas' 
search of Mr. Bowman was unlawful, as was the seizure of the scale. 
In fact, that conclusion is particularly appropriate here, since the Court of Appeals 
has also recognized that, when the items purportedly giving rise to reasonable suspicion 
are non-criminal in nature, "although they could be viewed in a suspicious light, (they] 
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do not support a commonsense evaluation that there was a fair probability that 
contraband existed in the [area to be searched]." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 
(Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the 
district court's conclusion that Officer Bonas could validly search the scale as part of this 
expanded investigation absent valid consent should be rejected as erroneous 
C. The Officers Unreasonably Prolonged The Stop 
The district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress is also erroneous 
because the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop. Traffic stops are limited in 
scope, and in that regard, are analogous to investigative detentions. State v. Danney, 
153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012). As such, they are limited by the principles set forth in Terry. 
Id. Such detentions '"must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop."' Id. (quoting Henage, 143 Idaho at 658 (quoting 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983))). For example, if the officers abandon the 
purpose of the stop to allow for a drug dog search, that extension "must be justified by a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id. 
The violation of Mr. Bowman's rights in this regard is plainly evident in this case. 
Officer Miller testified that Officer Jones wrote a ticket for Mr. Bowman, and at that point, 
they had no reason to continue to detain Mr. Bowman. (Tr., Vol.1, p.97, L.18 - p.98, 
L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.14-17.) However, they continued to hold him "Until [Officer 
Bonas] finished his job." (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.5-6.) Therefore, the facts clearly 
demonstrate that the officers prolonged the stop to continue to allow the drug dog to 
continue to sniff Mr. Bowman's car. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has made it 
abundantly clear that such behavior violates the Fourth Amendment: "A drug dog sniff 
is not a search and may be done during an investigative stop, but the use of the drug 
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dog may not lengthen the duration of the stop." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8 
(Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Since the officers admitted that they had no reason 
to continue to detain Mr. Bowman, but did so to allow Ruwa to continue sniffing the car, 
the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop, and all the evidence found thereafter should 
be suppressed. 
The conclusion that the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop in this case is also 
obvious if, as discussed in Section 8(1 ), supra, Officer Jones' initial pat down of 
Mr. Bowman was unlawful. The district court determined that the nature of the 
investigation changed once Officer Jones found the scale. (R., p.146.) However, if 
Officer Jones unlawfully discovered the scale, prolonging the stop based on that scale 
exploited the illegal search which discovered the scale, and thus, all the evidence found 
thereafter has to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
487-88; Bainbridge, 117 Idaho at 249. As a result, the officers' continued detention of 
Mr. Bowman after the purpose of the stop was complete (when they gave him the seat 
belt citation) was improper and violated Mr. Bowman's constitutional rights. 
Furthermore, even if the district court was correct, and the officers were justified 
in expanding the scope of their search once they found the scale in Mr. Bowman's 
pocket, whatever reasonable suspicion that discovery generated dissipated when the 
pat down search of Mr. Bowman and the dog sniff of the car revealed no other evidence 
of criminal activity. After all, the intrusion on a person's constitutional rights during a 
detention "should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel 
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 
(Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 500) (emphasis added). In fact, Officer 
Miller's admission that the officers did not have any reasonable suspicion to continue 
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detaining Mr. Bowman after Officer Jones wrote the seat belt ticket, which occurred 
while Ruwa was still sniffing the car, demonstrates that the fact that Mr. Bowman had a 
scale did not create any suspicion in their minds, particularly since Officer Jones gave 
the scale back to Mr. Bomwan. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.97, L.18 - p.98, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.100, 
Ls.14-17.) Since the suspicion had been dispelled once Ruwa finished sniffing the car, 
the officers unlawfully prolonged the stop by continuing to detain, question, and search 
Mr. Bowman. 
It is important to note here that the district court considered an inappropriate 
factor in its reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations - the fact that 
Mr. Bowman had invoked his right to refuse to consent to a search. The district court 
explained, "nothing in our law requires a police officer assessing the existence of 
probable cause to disregard a suspect's refusal to consent to such a search as one of 
the factors supporting the determination that probable cause exists."16 (R., p.144 n.1.) 
Considering Mr. Bowman's invocation of his constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable, warrantless searches in any reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
determination is wholly inappropriate. "[A] refusal of consent can play no role in the 
reasonable suspicion calculus." United States v. $85,688.00 in United States Currency, 
_ Fed.Appx. _, 2014 WL 4237377, *5 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (emphasis in 
original). 17 "Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and 
16 While the district court only specifically mentioned this factor in determining whether 
the officers had probable cause to search the car after Ruwa alerted on the scale, its 
explanation of why it was considering that factor - that nothing requires an officer to 
disregard a refusal to give consent - applies to all the challenged searches, since 
Mr. Bowman refused to give consent when Officer Miller asked to search the car even 
before Officer Jones' initial pat down search of Mr. Bowman. 
17 Although unpublished decisions are not precedential, the Tenth Circuit rules allow 
unpublished decisions to be cited for persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (a). 
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probable cause requirements, as well as the doctrine. principles 
would be considerably less if citizens' that and 
conducted in conformity with constitutional norms could create the suspicion or cause 
that renders their consent unnecessary." United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345 
(10th Cir. 1998). Therefore, as the Arizona Court of Appeals effectively summarized: 
the invocation of one's constitutional rights cannot constitute a 
circumstance that gives rise to reasonable suspicion. If the mere refusal of 
consent itself constituted reasonable suspicion, nothing would prevent 
warrantless searches of random individuals, because either the grant or 
refusal of consent would eventually justify the searches. We conclude 
that the Fourth Amendment would be rendered largely meaningless by 
placing every person in such a Catch-22. "[W]e believe that a defendant's 
invocation of constitutional rights is probative of no thin~ [sic] except the 
defendant's awareness of his or her constitutional rights." 8 
State v. Sweeney, 227 P.3d 868, 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Palenkas, 
933 P.2d 1269, 1280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)). The fact that the district court was willing to 
inappropriately consider this factor at any point in its analysis gives rise to a concern 
that it considered that same factor at every turn. As such, the district court's 
determination that there was reasonable suspicion is irretrievably tainted by its improper 
consideration of his invocation of his constitutional rights, and so, should be rejected by 
this Court. 
18 Several other courts, both state and federal, have similarly concluded that considering 
a defendant's invocation of his constitutional rights in a reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause determination is impermissible. See, e.g., In re H.H., 174 Cal.App.4th 
653, 658-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); United States v. Leal, 235 Fed.Appx. 937, 940 
(3rd Cir. 2007); United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1110 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Garner v. State, 566 S.E.2d 329, 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); United States v. Smith, 263 
F.3d 571, 594 (6th Cir. 2001 ); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666 (Colo. 2001) (en bane) 
(abrogated on other grounds by People v. Esparza, 272 P.3d 367 (Colo. 2012) 
(en bane)); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 435 n.32 (5th Cir. 2001 ); 
D.K. v. State, 736 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds by 
McLain v. State, 963 N.E.2d 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 
1095, 1097 (D.C. App. 1993); Gomez v. State, 572 So.2d 952, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990). 
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Considering 
the 
appropriate 
in this case. 
there was 
the Idaho 
to 
Court "an 
investigative stop cannot continue beyond the point when reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity evaporate[s]." State v. Allgood, 98 Idaho 525, 529 (1977) (citing Terry, 
392 U.S. at 17-18). Reasonable suspicion and probable cause are "fluid concept(s]-
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts." 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Therefore, just as a situation may evolve to 
create reasonable suspicion where none was originally evident, a situation may evolve 
to dispel any such reasonable suspicion that has already arisen. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit has pointed out that probable cause "may be dissipated if the investigating 
officer later learns additional information that decreases the likelihood that the 
defendant has engaged, or is engaging in criminal activity," and "[police] may not 
disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause." United States v. Ortiz-Herandez, 
427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005). "[A]dditional information obtained at the scene may 
indicate that there is less than a fair probability that the defendant has committed or is 
committing a crime. In such cases, execution of the arrest or continuation of the arrest 
is illegal. . . . It will not suffice that at some earlier point in time-before the police 
gleaned certain 'dissipating' facts-the police may have had probable cause." United 
States v. Lopez, 482 F .3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007). 
In this case, two facts became evident that dispelled whatever reasonable 
suspicion may have arisen from Officer Jones finding the scale. First, Officer Jones' 
search of Mr. Bowman's person did not uncover any apparent contraband, particularly 
since Officer Jones returned the scale to Mr. Bowman's possession. (See Tr., Vol.1, 
p.31, Ls.7-10.) Second, and more notably, Ruwa did not alert on the car. (Tr., Vol.1, 
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p:124, Ls.16-17.) In fact, Officer Miller admitted on cross examination that, even before 
Ruwa finished sniffing the car, the situation had evolved to the point that the probability 
that Mr. Bowman was engaged in criminal activity was reduced so far that the officers 
did not have a reason to continue detaining Mr. Bowman. (Tr., Vol.1, p.98, Ls.5-14; 
Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.14-17.) Thus, adding in the fact that Ruwa did not alert on the car 
definitely dissipated any lingering suspicion of potential criminal activity. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has considered a similar situation and explained: 
"[A] failed drug sniff is exactly the type of evidence that tends to undermine the 
conclusion of the presence of drugs. It is a negating factor that has a substantial impact 
on the determination of probable cause, and cannot be lightly ignored." 
Longshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1156 (Md. 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
found that, in the totality of the circumstances of that particular case, probable cause did 
not dissipate when, after a positive alert on the exterior of a car, the drug dog did not 
alert in the interior of that car. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703 (2012). However, this 
case is distinguishable, since there was no positive alert preceding the "no alert." As 
the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, when a dog has reliable training, that 
"provide[s] sufficient reason to trust his alert," or, as in this case, his non-alert on a car. 19 
Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1056-57 (2013) (also recognizing that, "[i]f a dog on 
patrol fails to alert to a car containing drugs, the mistake will usually go undetected 
because the officer will not initiate a search" in such cases). Therefore, in the totality of 
the circumstances of this case, officers no longer had reasonable suspicion that criminal 
19 Officer Bonas testified that he and Ruwa were a certified as a handler team with a 
substantial amount of training together at the time of their encounter with Mr. Bowman. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.108, L.4 - p.115, L.6; Exhibit 4 (letter of certification for Officer Bonas and 
Ruwa).) Ruwa's reliability was not challenged below. (See generally R.) 
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activity was afoot when Ruwa did not alert on Mr. Bowman's car; at best, they had a 
hunch. As a result, the prolongation of Mr. Bowman's detention was unlawful. 
As former Chief Justice Schroeder has observed, "[i]n the aftermath of the reality 
of [the person searched] possessing drugs it is tempting to find a rationalization for 
justifying the search. However, wrapped around the overlays of Terry interpretation [sic] 
is a simple concept of personal privacy and security." Henage, 143 Idaho at 663 
(Schroeder, C.J., specially concurring). Properly applying these rules, at the point that 
the purpose of the traffic stop was complete, that person should have been free to go on 
about his business like any other citizen. Id. In this case, once the reason for detaining 
Mr. Bowman ended (by delivering the citation and by reasonable suspicion dissipating), 
the continued detention so officers could continue to intrude on Mr. Bowman's 
constitutional right to privacy was unlawful. 
D. Mr. Bowman's Consent To Allow Officer Bonas To See The Scale Was Not 
Voluntary 
Consent is another exception to the warrant requirement. However, to be valid, 
that consent must be voluntary. When consent is given following an unlawful detention, 
that consent is invalid because of the taint of the unlawful detention. State v. Gutierrez, 
137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Ba,wick, 94 Idaho 139, 142 
(1971) (reaching that same conclusion in regard to an unlawful arrest). Therefore, since 
the officers had unlawfully prolonged the stop when Mr. Bowman let Officer Bonas see 
the scale (see Section C, supra), that consent was invalidated by the unlawful detention. 
Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Mr. Bowman's 
consent was not voluntary, and thus, did not justify the warrantless search. See 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (holding that courts look to the totality of the 
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circumstances to determine if consent was voluntary); State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 
778 (Ct. App. 2006) (same). Mere acquiescence does not constitute knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary consent. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548A9 
(1986); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98 (Ct App. 2006). There are several factors 
which may impact the determination of whether consent was voluntary, or whether it 
was coerced by the officers overbearing the defendant's will. 20 Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778. Those factors 
include, but are not limited to, the number of officers involved, the location, conditions, 
and time at which the consent was given, whether the individual was free to leave, and 
whether the individual knew of his right to deny consent are all factors. Garcia, 143 
Idaho at 778. 
The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrate that Mr. Bowman did 
not give voluntary consent to allow Officer Bonas to warrantlessly seize the scale and 
search it. Mr. Bowman was stopped at night and ordered out of the car. See 
State v. Guiterrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651 (Ct. App. 2002) ("It is also likely that a person 
who has been directed by an officer to exit a vehicle would not believe that the traffic 
stop was over until he or she was permitted to return [to the car]."). There were three 
officers and one drug dog on scene dealing just with Mr. Bowman (Ms. Martinez had 
already been arrested and secured in the back of a patrol vehicle). Officer Jones 
20 While this test is an objective test, it is worth noting that Mr. Bowman did assert in an 
affidavit that the officers had overborne his will. Given the developments in the stop, 
such as the fact that Ruwa did not alert on the car and the fact that the officers had 
already patted him down, the officers' continued questions caused him to feel "that I did 
not have a choice but to allow him [Officer Bonas] to take it [the scale] out of my 
pocket." (R., pp.111-12.) 
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testified that he, at least, was uniformed and armed.21 (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.21-25.) There 
were also two other officers at the scene dealing with another matter. Thus, a 
reasonable person in Mr. Bowman's position would have seen five uniformed officers 
and three police vehicles at the scene, and would have felt less able to continue to 
refuse the officers' requests to search him or his property. 
That conclusion is more reasonable in this case, since Officer Miller testified that, 
during the initial detention of Mr. Bowman, he was planning to involve those other 
officers in Mr. Bowman's incident "at the end ... if we needed." (Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.15-
17.) Specifically, he was planning to have those officers transport either Mr. Bowman or 
Ms. Martinez to jail.22 (Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.11-17.) The fact that Officer Miller was 
already planning on how to effectively transport Mr. Bowman to jail further demonstrates 
that Mr. Bowman was never going to be free to leave. ( See also Tr., Vol.1, p.89, 
Ls.17-20 (Officer Miller testifying that he did not consider either Mr. Bowman or 
Ms. Martinez free to leave during the initial detention).) 
Furthermore, Mr. Bowman had also been informed, after the driver of the car had 
been arrested, that he would not be allowed to drive the car from the scene because of 
the cancelled registration. (Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.20-22.) In fact, in response to his inquiry 
about whether he was free to leave at all, Officer Jones only told him they would have to 
"work through that." (Tr., Vol.1, p.39, L.19 - p.40, L.4.) Mr. Bowman was never told that 
he was or would be free to leave. 
21 There was no indication that any of the other officers were not in their regular 
uniforms or without their service weapons. (See generally R.) 
22 Not only does that indicate that the situation was more coercive regarding 
Mr. Bowman's acquiescence to Officer Bonas, but it also demonstrates that the Officer 
Miller, at least had abandoned the purpose the stop, and thus, prolonged the detention 
beyond what was permissible (see Section C, supra). 
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Additionally, when Officer Miller took over questioning Mr. Bowman (while Officer 
Jones wrote the citation and Officer Bonas was performing the canine sniff of the car), 
his questioning became more confrontational, and it ultimately resulted in Officer Miller 
performing yet another pat down search of Mr. Bowman.23 (See Exhibit 2, 
approximately 13:40-16:50.) As the Court of Appeals has recognized, when an officer 
continues to question a person without telling him he is free to leave, especially when 
he has not been allowed to return to his car, the officer's emergency lights remain 
active, and the questioning is not sociable, a reasonable person would not have felt free 
to leave. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651. 
Furthermore, at the time Officer Bonas requested to see the scale, Mr. Bowman 
had been frisked, his car had been sniffed by a drug dog, and he had been provided a 
citation by Officer Jones. And yet, despite the fact that the officers had found nothing 
during those searches and had completed the purpose of the stop, he was still not being 
allowed to leave. Instead, was he was subjected to additional questioning by Officer 
Miller (who admitted he never intended to let Mr. Bowman leave at all; he was going to 
23 Officer Miller's pat down search, which began after Officer Bonas had begun 
searching the scale but before Ruwa alerted on the scale (see Exhibit 2), was also 
unlawful. It was not justified as a Terry stop since Mr. Bowman's knife had been taken 
from him and Officer Jones had already searched him for weapons. As such, Officer 
Miller could not have harbored a reasonable concern that Mr. Bowman was armed or 
presently dangerous. And, while Mr. Bowman did acquiesce to Officer Miller's "request" 
to perform that search, that acquiescence was, like the acquiescence to Officer Bonas, 
not voluntary. 
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Bowman acquiesced to Officer Miller's request to 
conduct this third search of his person reinforces the conclusion that Mr. Bowman had 
acquiesced to Officer Bonas' request to seize the scale: when Officer Bonas piled on 
the continuing detention after putting Ruwa back in his vehicle, Mr. Bowman gave up 
and quit refusing all the requests to search, even though, during the initial portion of the 
detention, he had been exercising his rights in that regard. 
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find a reason to arrest him). Mr. Bowman also continued to be subjected to requests to 
search his person and his property. 
All these factors together demonstrate that, despite the fact that Mr. Bowman did 
know about his right to refuse consent, Mr. Bowman's consent to allow Officer Bonas to 
look at the scale was not voluntary; it was acquiescence to the overbearing nature of 
the officers' continued questioning. This conclusion is particularly clear in this case, 
where that additional questioning occurred during the unlawful prolonging of the 
detention. 
Therefore, for any and all of the foregoing reasons, the scale should have been 
suppressed. Since it was only Ruwa's alert on the scale that gave the officers probable 
cause to search the car, all the evidence found in the car is fruit of the poisonous tree, 
and should be suppressed as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bowman respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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